Kaushalya Perera
The 2024 general elections saw many academics on election stages and a visibly larger number in Parliament. Some of them now hold ministerial positions. Others have been appointed to various other institutions. It is unsurprising then that we academics as a class, have been looking at familiar faces in the news. Is this a new turn to a politicised university?
In 2012-2014 when I interviewed academics for my doctoral research, they referred to the politicication of our sector (education and higher education). The common understanding of this was of an interference from without. Politicians were outsiders, interfering and influencing the University Grants Commission (UGC) or the way universities worked or they were trying to place their stooges in high offices. One of my participants referred to the 1970s as the beginning of this unwarranted politicisation of academia. This has continued to date – we have seen academics being seconded to high positions in state institutions external to the education sector. (A secondment is when a public official or state employee takes leave to assume duties in a different state institution). The provision is present so that academics can provide expertise in a place where it is needed, e.g., when a children’s language expert is needed in the Ministry of Health.
When secondments are made in visibly unsuitable instances, there have been outcries and allegations of cronyism and politicisation. Still, for the longest time politicisation has entered higher education in plain sight, unnoticed by most of us, largely due to its validation through legal means. Applicants to a permanent academic position for example, respond to a call for applications which sets out the desired qualifications in a ‘scheme of recruitment’. Similarly, there are guidelines or requirements drawn up for some other positions, e.g., Director of Quality Assurance at the UGC. There is, however, a larger number of positions to which people are appointed not by a scheme of recruitment, nor nominated from a shortlist produced by a selection panel. Their names are being pulled out of a hat, as it were, by the President of the country, the Minister of Education or the UGC. There may be guiding principles set out in an Act or a regulation but these are flimsy enough to warrant appointing anyone that the ‘appointing authority’ chooses. The names in the hat are, like the magician’s silk tie, only a surprise to the audience. Let’s take the provisions of the Universities Act no. 16 of 1978.
* The President appoints the UGC Chair, Vice Chair and the five Commission members.
* The UGC then appoints other staff members of the UGC, requisitioning state employees from other state institutions if they so desire. It can also set up standing committees or ad hoc committees as it sees fit, and appoint members for those. These committees must be chaired by the Commissioners themselves.
* The UGC also appoints nearly half of the Council – the managing body of a state university. It includes several ex officio members from within the university itself, plus the UGC’s appointees, the number decided by the Act. This can be up to 15 appointees depending on the university. At present, 17 universities are governed by the Act. Each university has members appointed by the UGC in their Council, including some nominated by the Minister.
You should now have a general sense of how the management of universities are impacted each election cycle. Some of these appointments may have guidelines attached, which are vague enough to be of use to a politician, but many do not.
The Minister of Education’s remit extends over the whole of the education sector and, therefore, she (or he as the case may be) is required by law and thus has the ‘obligation’ to appoint a much larger number of people to offices – to other state universities outside the UGC (e.g., Buddhist and Pali University), to institutions such as the National Institute of Education, and so on and so forth. She also has to nominate or recommend others to the President. According to information obtained via a Right to Information request, the President has so far given nearly 50 appointments in the education sector (excluding the appointments of vice chancellors which have a selection process).
The sheer scale of such appointments across state institutions can only be imagined.
So why is this a problem? After all, academics are state employees who have experience (if not a specialisation) in the education sector. Many of them may embody a passionate work ethic, have experienced the failings of previous governments and the harm such governments have done to higher education and will, hopefully, try to do their best for the future of our institutions. As I have been asked, these positions must anyway be filled by academics so why not these particular academics? Why does the manner of appointment matter, if the Minister has the best interests of the sector at heart and thus will appoint suitable people, and if the UGC is full of similarly ‘good’ people? Why does it matter, if this is the means to change the system for the better?
It matters because by virtue of the modus of these appointments, they become political. A political appointment is one who is chosen and who works on the principle of shared networks: Who do you know for this position? Are they good?
In the best of outcomes, the position is filled by an individual who can contribute to that position and that institution through their expertise. Long term, nevertheless, there are repercussions to the sector which we should consider.
* Power circulates in a small, known circle. We rely on people we know, have heard of through other networks, etc. We cannot nominate people we don’t know, however suitable they may be.
* The nominator – be it the President, the Minister or others close to them – will, at some point, run out of known names to appoint to key positions. The burden to appoint ‘good people’ weighs on the nominator and, therefore, unknown names are treated with suspicion. How do we know they are good? One must take a chance on them but if they do not perform well, it rebounds on the nominator.
* Decision-making is easier and at the same time harder. Speaking truth to power is harder when the person sitting in the hot seat is your comrade, your friend or your friend’s friend. Loyalty makes one slightly hard of hearing when critique comes about. Hard hitting questions might be softened in light of social connections. A dissenting vote or opinion may not be raised because social connections or political comradeship might be jeopardised. Social networks make it harder for us to walk away from uncomfortable situations.
* State institutions are tied to election cycles. Boards or committees dissolve with the end of a government. Closer to general elections, officials and committee members prepare to step down to make way for the new team (or attempt to curry favour with the incoming political party to be able to continue in office).
Appointing people to positions in this way is an insidious form of politicisation because it appears to be de rigueur.
But this can, of course, be changed.
One can set up schemes of recruitment, an application process, a set of criteria for inclusion or exclusion that limit the pool of possible candidates. I do not mean to claim that these are foolproof. Lived experience tells us that it is possible to rig selections, manipulate loopholes and so on. Indeed, the academic grapevine is constantly passing on stories of such events. Still, changing this system from one that appoints people to office or committee without a selection procedure, to one involving open calls and/or selection criteria, provides an opportunity for suitable persons (with or without political connections) to apply. Such appointments need not be tied to election cycles and can also provide the public with opportunities to counter or protest less suitable candidates. It will also pave the way to strengthening the independence of our institutions.
Politicisation in this fashion is not a new problem that the NPP government has brought to us. On the contrary, de-politicisation was an election promise! It permeates all our institutions, because this is how the entire system works. This is a long-existing canker that has already weakened our governance systems and which the current government–with its much vaunted majority–is in a prime position to change for the better. Circulars can be rescinded, Acts can be amended, policies and selection criteria can be put in place. A more planned, transparent policy for appointments is surely within the realm of possibility for a government with virtually absolute power.
