Udari Abeyasinghe
It has been almost two months since the judgement of Abeyasinghe v Tilakaratne and others by the Supreme Court. Since then, I have often been asked a simple question, which I too have asked myself. “Has anything actually changed?” my answer is both yes and no. Judgements can uphold the law, direct institutions and clarify principles. But they cannot, by themselves, change cultures.
I shall take the liberty of writing this piece because, in the weeks following the judgment, I have found myself reflecting less on the outcome of the case and more on what it reveals about our institutions. Yet institutions do not change simply because a court has spoken. They change only when they are willing to question long-held assumptions, reflect honestly on their procedures and practices, learn from their shortcomings and act decisively to foster a culture that places accountability at its center.
The myth of the perfect victim
One such assumption is about the conduct of the Ideal or perfect victim. The concept of the “ideal victim” was first articulated by the Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie in 1986. Interestingly, Christie was not concerned with identifying those most likely to become victims of crime. Instead, his question was, Who is most readily recognized and accepted by society as a “real” victim? Society is often more willing to extend sympathy and credibility to victims who fit a particular stereotype. According to Christie, the “ideal victim” is someone perceived to be weak and vulnerable, engaged in a respectable activity, in a place where they have every right to be, harmed by someone clearly viewed as “big” or “bad,” and, importantly, a stranger rather than someone they know. These characteristics continue to influence how victims are perceived today. Although we may not consciously apply such criteria, they often shape our instinctive judgments about who deserves to be believed.
In the context of sexual violence within universities, the assumptions surrounding the ideal victim quickly begin to unravel. Power relationships within universities are often complex, and professional relationships may have existed before the misconduct. The alleged perpetrator may not be a stranger but a lecturer, supervisor, colleague, or fellow student. The complainant may continue interacting with the alleged perpetrator because academic progression or employment leaves little choice. When a victim does not fit the mould of the “perfect victim,” attention shifts away from the conduct of the alleged perpetrator and towards the conduct of the complainant.
What should be kept in mind is that victims respond to trauma differently. Some report immediately; many do not. Some become emotional; others appear composed. Some resign from their workplace, while others continue to work because they have no realistic alternative or because they wish to confront the violence head on. Some preserve every piece of evidence; others delete messages simply because they cannot bear to see them again. Yet these perfectly human responses are often interpreted as reasons to doubt credibility.
Universities provide a particularly complex setting for this phenomenon. Most complainants do not initially seek justice. More often, they simply want the harassment to stop so that they can continue their education or employment in an environment where they feel safe. Sometimes victims make anonymous complaints, not because they wish to avoid accountability, but because anonymity provides the only sense of security they have. During preliminary inquiries/ fact finding processes, confidentiality can often be maintained. However, if the matter proceeds to a formal disciplinary process, complainants are usually required to reveal their identities. It is at this point that many decide not to proceed further, not because the harassment did not occur, but because the personal cost of pursuing justice becomes overwhelming.
Perhaps this should prompt us to ask a different question. Instead of asking why anonymous complaints exist or why complainants don’t come forward (sooner), should we not ask why so many complainants feel unsafe engaging with the institutional process?
The subject of scrutiny
When survivors do come forward, they frequently encounter another familiar phenomenon, victim blaming.
“Why didn’t you complain earlier?”
“Why didn’t you go to the police?”
“If you were sexually harassed, why are you still working there?”
“Why did you continue interacting with him?”
“The reason this happened is because you showed positivity towards him.”
“There is no smoke without fire.”
Although these questions appear different, they have something in common. They all examine the behavior of the complainant. Very few begin by asking why the alleged perpetrator behaved in the way described. The familiar proverb, “There is no smoke without fire,” is often used to suggest that the complainant must have done something to invite the misconduct. Yet perhaps we have misunderstood where the fire lies. The fire is not the complainant’s behavior. The fire is the conduct of the alleged perpetrator. The complaint is the smoke that finally becomes visible.
These responses also reveal another contradiction. If a victim complains immediately, some might question their motives. If they delay, the delay becomes the issue. If they resign, they may be described as unstable or unable to cope. If they remain in employment, their continued presence is taken as evidence that the misconduct could not have been serious or that it never had happened. If they show emotion, they risk being dismissed as irrational. If they remain composed, they may be accused of exaggerating. In truth, there is often no version of events in which a complainant can satisfy every expectation placed upon them. If our systems only work for the “perfect victim,” then they were never truly designed for victims at all.
The silence that speaks
The recent judgment also prompted me to reflect on another aspect of institutional culture, silence. Within academia, even discussing judgments concerning one’s own institution may be framed as bringing the institution into disrepute. Such framing places academics in an impossible position. Those who speak are sometimes portrayed as being disloyal or as failing to respect the institution they serve. Yet genuine respect for an institution should not require silence in the face of injustice. Universities are places that encourage academic freedom, critical inquiry, evidence-based reasoning, and intellectual debate. They should therefore be places where uncomfortable conversations are not avoided but embraced.
The relative silence surrounding the judgment in academia raises important questions. Does silence reflect satisfaction that justice has been served? Does it reflect concern about damaging the reputation of one’s university? Does it reflect uncertainty about whether difficult institutional conversations are welcome? Or does it reflect a real or perceived fear of professional consequences for speaking openly? These are questions that deserve thoughtful reflection.
Post judgement reflections
At the same time, my experience in the weeks following the judgment has also been one of hope. Individuals who have experienced different forms of abuse have quietly come forward to share their own stories with me. Some have sought legal advice. Others have simply wanted someone to listen. Their experiences remind me that judgments do more than resolve disputes between parties. They send messages to those who have remained silent, that seeking justice remains possible. Perhaps that is one answer to the question I posed at the beginning of this article. Has anything actually changed? For some victims, I believe the answer is yes. A judgement can restore hope and encourage those who had previously felt that their voices would never be heard.
Yet judgments alone cannot erase trauma, restore lost years, or undo the personal and professional consequences that many victims endure. Courts can interpret the law, but they cannot, by themselves, transform institutional culture. Culture changes only when institutions and university communities are willing to learn from judgments rather than merely comply with them. It changes when realities of power imbalances are recognized, when credibility is assessed through evidence rather than stereotypes, and when the question “Why did the victim not come forward sooner?” is replaced with “What conditions made it so difficult for the victim to come forward?” Ultimately, the true value of a judgement lies not only in the orders it makes, but also in the conversations it inspires and the institutional self-reflection it demands. Whether anything truly changes will not depend on the judgement itself, but on whether institutions have the courage to learn from them.
